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N egotiable fate refers to the idea that one can negotiate with fate for control, and that people can exercisepersonal agency within the limits that fate has determined. Research on negotiable fate has found greater
prevalence of related beliefs in Southeast Asia, East Asia, and Eastern Europe than in Western Europe and
English-speaking countries. The present research extends previous findings by exploring the cognitive
consequences of the belief in negotiable fate. It was hypothesized that this belief enables individuals to maintain
faith in the potency of their personal actions and to remain optimistic in their goal pursuits despite the immutable
constraints. The belief in negotiable fate was predicted to (a) facilitate sense-making of surprising outcomes;
(b) increase persistence in goal pursuits despite early unfavorable outcomes; and (c) increase risky choices when
individuals have confidence in their luck. Using multiple methods (e.g., crosscultural comparisons, culture
priming, experimental induction of fate beliefs), we found supporting evidence for our hypotheses in three
studies. Furthermore, as expected, the cognitive effects of negotiable fate are observed only in cultural contexts
where the fate belief is relatively prevalent. Implications of these findings are discussed in relation to the
intersubjective approach to understanding the influence of culture on cognitive processes (e.g., Chiu, Gelfand,
Yamagishi, Shteynberg, & Wan, 2010), the sociocultural foundations that foster the development of a belief
in negotiable fate, and an alternative perspective for understanding the nature of agency in contexts where
constraints are severe. Future research avenues are also discussed.
Keywords: Fate belief; Implicit theories; Cognitive consequences.
L e destin ne´gociable se re´fe`re a` l’ide´e que quelqu’un peut ne´gocier avec le destin afin d’obtenir plusde controˆle et que les gens peuvent exercer une action personnelle dans les limites de´termine´es par le destin.
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La recherche sur le destin ne´gociable a montre´ une plus grande popularite´ de croyances y e´tant relie´es dans l’Asie
du Sud-Est, dans l’Asie de l’Est et en Europe de l’Est qu’en Europe de l’Ouest et dans les pays anglophones.
La pre´sente recherche va au-dela` des re´sultats ante´rieurs en explorant les conse´quences cognitives de la croyance
au destin ne´gociable. Nous avons fait l’hypothe`se que la croyance au destin ne´gociable permet a` l’individu de
faire confiance au pouvoir de ses actions personnelles et de demeurer optimiste dans la poursuite de ses buts
en de´pit de contraintes ine´vitables. Nous avons pre´dit que la croyance au destin ne´gociable (a) facilite
l’interpre´tation de re´sultats e´tonnants, (b) accroıˆt la perse´ve´rance dans l’atteinte des buts malgre´ les re´sultats
de´favorables du de´but et (c) l’accroissement de choix risque´s quand les individus font confiance a` leur chance.
Par l’utilisation de me´thodes multiples (par exemple, les comparaisons transculturelles, l’amorc¸age de la culture,
l’induction expe´rimentale de croyances a` l’e´gard du destin), nous avons obtenus des donne´es corroborant nos
hypothe`ses dans trois e´tudes. De plus, tel qu’attendu, les effets cognitifs du destin ne´gociable ont e´te´ observe´s que
dans les contextes culturels ou` cette croyance au destin est relativement populaire. La discussion met en relation
les implications de ces re´sultats avec l’approche intersubjective pour la compre´hension de l’influence de la culture
sur les processus cognitifs (par exemple, Chiu, Gelfand, Yamagishi, Shteynberg et Wan, 2010), les fondements
socioculturels qui favorisent le de´veloppement de la croyance au destin ne´gociable et une autre perspective
permettant de comprendre la nature de l’action dans les contextes ou` les contraintes sont importantes.
Nous discutons aussi de possibilite´s de recherche futures.
E l destino negociable hace alusion a la idea que una persona puede negociar con el destino respectodel control, y que las personas tienen cierta agencia personal dentro de los lı´mites que el destino ha
predeterminado. Las investigaciones sobre el destino negociable han encontrado mayor popularidad de creencias
relacionadas con el sudeste y este de Asia, y de Europa oriental, por sobre Europa occidental y los paı´ses de habla
inglesa. El presente estudio es una extensio´n de investigaciones previas, y explora las consecuencias cognitivas de
creer en el destino negociable. Se hipotetizo´ que la creencia en un destino negociable permite que el individuo
mantenga la fe en el poder de sus acciones personales y se mantenga optimista en la lucha por alcanzar sus
objetivos a pesar de limitaciones inmutables. Se predijo que la creencia en el destino negociable (a) ayudaba
a encontrar sentido en caso de resultados sorprendentes; (b) incrementaba la perseverancia en la lucha por
alcanzar los objetivos a pesar de resultados negativos en una primera instancia; e (c) incrementaba las elecciones
arriesgadas cuando la persona confiaba en su suerte. Al utilizar me´todos mu´ltiples (por ejemplo, comparaciones
transculturales, estı´mulos culturales, e induccio´n experimental de creencias sobre el destino), se encontraron
evidencias que apoyan nuestra hipo´tesis en tres estudios. Asimismo, como era de esperar, los efectos cognitivos
del destino negociable se observan u´nicamente en los contextos culturales donde la creencia sobre el destino es
relativamente popular. Se debaten las implicaciones de estos hallazgos en relacio´n con el enfoque intersubjetivo
para entender la influencia de la cultura sobre los procesos cognitivos, (por ejemplo, Chiu, Gelfand, Yamagishi,
Shteynberg, & Wan, 2010), las bases socioculturales que fomentan el desarrollo de la creencia en un destino
negociable, y una perspectiva alternativa para entender la naturaleza de la agencia en contextos donde existen
restricciones severas. Se mencionan tambie´n futuros caminos de investigacio´n.
Fate beliefs have received increased attention
in crosscultural research (Chan, Wan, & Sin,
2009; Chaturvedi, Chiu, & Viswanathan, 2009;
Norenzayan & Lee, 2010; Tang & Wu, 2010;
Young, Morris, Burrus, Krishnan, & Regmi,
in press). One extensively researched constellation
of fate beliefs is fate control, which refers to a
collection of beliefs that support the expectations
that life events are predetermined and that there
are some ways for people to influence these
outcomes. This constellation of beliefs include
fatalistic determinism (‘‘Fate determines one’s
successes and failures’’), predictability of prede-
termined outcomes (‘‘Most disasters can be pre-
dicted’’), cycle of fortune and misfortune
(‘‘Good luck follows if one survives a disaster’’),
and possible personal control over luck (‘‘There
are certain ways to help us improve our luck
and avoid being unlucky’’). Individuals who
believe in negotiable fate accept that life events
are predetermined but at the same time expect that
there are some ways for people to influence
important life outcomes. Fate control has been
found to be one of the five belief dimensions that
differentiate different national cultures (Leung &
Bond, 2004).
The concept of negotiable fate, epitomized in the
popular saying ‘‘If fate hands you lemons, make
lemonade,’’ captures the agentic aspect of fate
control, focusing on personal efficacy in maximiz-
ing gains and minimizing losses given the circum-
stances and boundaries set by fate (Au et al.,
in press). Individuals who subscribe to this belief
expect that they can negotiate with fate for
control, and that they can exercise personal
agency within the limits that fate has determined
(Au, 2008; Chaturvedi et al., 2009; Young &
Morris, 2004).
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CULTURAL VARIATIONS IN
NEGOTIABLE FATE
A recent crosscultural study showed that the belief
in negotiable fate is more prevalent in China than
in the United States (Au et al., in press). Leung
and Bond (2004) found parallel crosscultural
differences in fate control. Subsequent studies
show that the relative prevalence of the beliefs in
fate control and negotiable fate across societies
may reflect the different levels of constraints
people in these societies face in their life space
(Au et al., in press; Chaturvedi et al., 2009). For
example, these beliefs are more widely endorsed in
countries and communities that face severe physi-
cal and economic constraints (e.g., have lower life
expectancy at birth, lower level of environmental
sustainability, lower gross domestic product per
capita) and have fewer political and civil liberties
(Chaturvedi et al., 2009; Leung & Bond, 2010).
To explain this result, Au et al. (in press) contend
that in a sociocultural context in which people are
confronted with many immutable constraints,
believing that individuals are capable of over-
coming any obstacle to attain their goals is likely
to be maladaptive because people in such a context
often encounter demoralizing frustrations resulting
from numerous constraints. In such a context, by
believing that their outcomes are jointly shaped
by the self and an uncontrollable external agent
(e.g., fate),1 individuals are better able to accept
the limits of their personal agency imposed by
unchangeable constraints, while maintaining
faith in the potency of their personal actions
(Chan et al., 2009). Consistent with this idea,
research has shown that in societies where indivi-
duals face many immutable constraints, the belief
in negotiable fate is associated with greater
engagement in active coping (Au et al., in press)
and with the likelihood of exhibiting cognitive
styles that support analytical problem-solving
(Chaturvedi et al., 2009). Other research has also
shown that the belief in fate control is associated
with higher academic achievement and economic
competitiveness (Zhou, Leung, & Bond, 2009).
SOME COGNITIVE AND BEHAVIORAL
CONSEQUENCES OF NEGOTIABLE FATE
Although past research has clarified the nature
of negotiable fate as an important cultural belief,
relatively little is known about its cognitive and
behavioral consequences. The present research fills
this gap. In an environment with many immutable
constraints, individuals frequently experience
expectation disconfirmations: The expected out-
come does not materialize due to unforeseeable
and immutable external factors. To remain opti-
mistic in their goal pursuits despite the immutable
constraints, individuals need to (a) make sense of
the surprising outcomes, (b) persist in goal pursuits
despite early unfavorable outcomes, and (c) make
risky choices when they have confidence in their
luck. To elaborate, being able to make sense of—
and accept—unexpected outcomes enables indivi-
duals to move on to solving the problem (see
Muller & Stahlberg, 2007). In addition, persistence
on receiving unfavourable feedback engages indi-
viduals in active goal pursuits despite frustrations
rather than giving up (Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin,
& Wan, 1999). Finally, when individuals expect
that their outcomes are jointly determined by
internal and external forces, actively using signs of
luck to maximize gains and minimize losses confers
a sense of illusory control (see Valenzuela, Mellers,
& Strebel, 2010; Young, Chen, & Morris, 2009).
These individuals feel that if they align decision-
making with their luck, they can control their
outcomes. We argue that the belief in negotiable
fate prepares its subscribers to make sense of
surprising outcomes by attributing them to fate,
to remain persistent despite initial frustrations,
and to make risky choices when feeling confident
in their luck. Thus, we hypothesize that people
who believe in negotiable fate would be less
surprised by unexpected outcomes, would be
more persistent in pursuing a failing investment,
and would make more risky choices when they feel
that they have good luck.
EFFECTS OF SHARED REALITY
Recent advances in culture and cognition research
reveal that a belief has greater impact on cogni-
tions if it is part of the shared reality in the culture
(Chiu et al., 2010; Zou et al., 2009)—the belief
is widely accepted in the culture. When a belief
is well established in the culture, its psychological
meanings are immediately recognized, and its
cognitive and behavioral practices are readily
accepted by members of the culture.
1Although this uncontrollable, external agent may be considered as God, the use of the word ‘‘fate’’ was selected because of
its religion-neutral connotations. Individuals can agree to the perceived existence of ‘‘fate’’ regardless of their religion and the
extent to which they are religious. Indeed, Pepitone and Saffiotti (1997) have found that individuals are more likely to attribute
certain types of event to fate as compared to other events—suggesting that the belief in fate can be a common one.
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Thus, we contend that the hypothesized associa-
tion between negotiable fate and the three cog-
nitive strategies described above would be
particularly strong in contexts where this belief is
widely accepted (e.g., Asian communities), because
the psychological meaning of this belief has been
firmly established in these contexts. This conten-
tion complements the ecological analysis of
negotiable fate reviewed above, which states that
belief in negotiable fate is more widely distributed
in societies where people encounter many con-
straints in their goal pursuits. In such societies, the
belief in negotiable fate and its attendant cognitive
strategies are particularly useful for focusing
people’s attention on active goal pursuits.
OVERVIEW OF STUDIES
We tested our hypotheses in three studies. In Study
1, we examine how negotiable fate helps indivi-
duals deal with unexpected outcomes. We predict
that, in contexts where the belief in negotiable
fate is widely shared (Asian-American culture),
this belief enables individuals to recruit fate as a
post-hoc explanation for unexpected outcomes.
Consequently, having quickly made sense of the
unexpected outcomes, people in this context
would report being less surprised. Hence, instead
of remaining in a state of shock and refusing
to accept the unexpected outcomes, they move
on to problem-solving. However, the association
between negotiable fate and surprise would be
weak in contexts where negotiable fate is not a
prevalent belief.
Study 2 focuses on how negotiable fate enables
individuals to persist upon experiencing setbacks.
Perseverance upon setbacks is crucial for survival,
especially in contexts where individuals face severe
constraints in everyday life. The belief in negoti-
able fate enables individuals to maintain a sense
of self-efficacy (Au et al., in press) by accepting the
elements of their lives that they cannot change and
focusing on those that can be managed through
agentic actions. Past research has linked discrimi-
native facility (engaging in agentic actions in
controllable situations and attention distraction
in uncontrollable ones) to persistent goal pursuits
(Chiu, Hong, Mischel, & Shoda, 1995). Thus,
in the current study, we hypothesized a positive
relationship between the belief in negotiable fate
and persistence in cultural contexts where the
belief is relatively prevalent and its meanings
relatively well accepted. To test this hypothesis,
we employed the cultural priming paradigm
(Hong, Morris, Chiu & Benet-Martinez, 2000) to
examine the contextual effects of negotiable fate.
The participants were Westernized Singaporeans
who are familiar with both Western and Asian
cultures. Because the belief of negotiable fate is
more prevalent, and its meanings more accepted,
in Asian culture, we hypothesize that following
contextual activation of Asian culture, the belief
in negotiable fate would be associated with
persistence in goal pursuits, and that this associa-
tion would be attenuated following contextual
activation of Western culture.
Although the belief in negotiable fate is not
widely shared in American culture, this belief, like
other declarative knowledge, can be rendered
salient in an experiment. Furthermore, once
this belief has been made salient, it will affect
Americans’ cognitive responses. Thus, in Study 3,
to establish the causal effect of negotiable fate on
decision-making, we activated this belief in some
Americans. Specifically, we did so by asking
European Americans to recall times in which
they worked around the predetermined fate
(i.e., priming negotiable fate). In the control
condition, we asked European Americans to
recall times in which they overcame their seemingly
predetermined fate (i.e., the prevalent or default
fate belief in the US). Following the belief
manipulation, we examined when the belief in
negotiable fate would lead European Americans
to become more risk-averse or more risk-taking.
Although the belief in negotiable fate accepts that
life events are predetermined, it asserts that there
are some ways for people to influence important
life outcomes within the limits that fate has
determined (Leung & Bond, 2004). For example,
people can perform certain behaviors to bring
good luck to the selves or discern signs of bad luck
in their environment, and align decision-making
with the reading of current luck; therefore, making
more risky choices when they feel that they have
good luck and more risk-averse choices when
they feel that they have bad luck. Indeed, in
societies where negotiable fate is well accepted,
many cultural practices are available for indivi-
duals to ‘‘negotiate’’ their fate. An example is
the Asian practice of feng shui—the practice of
placement and arrangement of space to achieve
harmony with the environment and bring about
good fortune. Engaging in this practice is expected
to bring good luck to the individuals. Once
individuals feel that they have secured protection
from fate, they may feel overconfident in their
ability to defeat the odds and hence make more
risky choices. In contrast, when individuals believ-
ing in negotiable fate feel that they have bad luck,
they may feel vulnerable and tend to avoid making
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risky choices. Thus, following the fate belief
manipulation, we made good (bad) luck salient
to some participants by asking them to list items
that are associated with good (bad) luck. We
hypothesize that Americans who have learned the
meaning of negotiable fate would become more
risk-averse when they are feeling unlucky (after
listing the bad luck items) and more risk-taking
when they are feeling lucky (after listing the good
luck items).
SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTIONS
In summary, past research has identified the belief
that one can control personal outcomes, even
though life events are predetermined, to be a major
dimension that differentiates national cultures
(Leung & Bond, 2004). Moreover, in countries
where this belief is widely shared, believing in
negotiable fate is positively linked to active coping
(Au et al., in press; Chaturvedi et al., 2009). This
result counters the intuition that believing in fate
is associated with passivity and withdrawal. Part
of the reason for this counterintuitive result is that
the belief in negotiable fate embodies the idea
that one can negotiate with fate for control. Thus,
subscribers to this fate belief readily accept the
logical contradiction between predetermination
and their ability to alter predetermined events
(Leung & Bond, 2004).
The present research extends this literature by
examining the possibility that in societies where the
belief in negotiable fate is widely shared, it is
accompanied by cognitive strategies that support
active goal pursuits. This belief (a) reduces surprise
at unexpected outcomes by resorting to fate as a
sense-making device; (b) encourages persistence in
risky investment despite initial frustration; and
(c) invites risky choices after negotiating with fate
for control through certain cultural practices. Thus,
although believing in fate may be associated with
maladaptive responses in some contexts, the belief
in negotiable fate may enable individuals to make
sense of unexpected outcomes, persist in the face of
setbacks, and find ways to maximize gains and
minimize losses. As such, the acknowledgement of
fate can actually promote agentic actions, as long as
it is also accompanied by the belief that personal
actions can also make a difference.
Finally, existing research on negotiable fate (e.g.,
Chaturvedi et al., 2009) has relied on correla-
tional results to clarify the nature of the construct.
The present research supplements the extant
literature by adopting a multimethod approach.
The methods used in three studies reported here
include a crosscultural comparison, experimental
cultural priming, and experimental induction of the
belief in negotiable fate. This multimethod
approach allows us to contextualize the cognitive
and behavioral effects of negotiable fate and
determines the causal impact of this fate belief on
decision-making.
STUDY 1
The first study tests the idea that negotiable fate
allows individuals to reduce the experience of
surprise resulting from expectancy disconfirma-
tion, particularly in a culture where this belief is
widely shared. As noted, the belief in negotiable
fate and its psychological meanings are more
prevalent in Asian than in American contexts
(Au et al., in press; Leung & Bond, 2004). In
addition, past research has shown that people from
Asian contexts are less surprised at unexpected
outcomes (Choi & Nisbett, 2000; Valenzuela et al.,
2010). Therefore, we assessed the relationship
between negotiable fate and surprise in Asian-
American and European-American contexts. We
predict that individuals who believe in negotiable
fate would be less surprised at unexpected out-
comes, and this association should be stronger
among Asian Americans than among European
Americans.
Method
Participants
Forty-six European American undergraduate
students (32.6% female) and 38 Asian American
undergraduate students (28.9% female) from
a public university participated in this study in
exchange for course requirement credit. Due to
an oversight, age information was not collected
for this study.
Measures
The negotiable fate measure (Au, 2008;
Chaturvedi et al., 2009) was used to assess the
belief in negotiable fate. The measure consists of
four items: ‘‘You should deal with what fate has
given you to make the best of things’’; ‘‘When fate
does not give you the most favorable situations,
you need to make the best of the situations you are
given’’; ‘‘Success comes from both luck and
effort’’; and ‘‘I should cherish every day that
fate allows me.’’ Participants indicated their extent
of agreement or disagreement with each item
on a seven-point scale, from 1 (strongly disagree)
to 7 (strongly agree).
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To distinguish between the consequence of the
belief in negotiable fate and the belief in fatalism
(the idea that one should submit the self to the
influence of fate), we also included a four-item
measure of fatalism adapted from Chaturvedi et al.
(2009). The items in the scale are: (1) ‘‘Your paths
in life are decided by fate, whether you want it to
or not’’; (2) ‘‘What happens in your life is already
predetermined’’; (3) ‘‘You cannot change what
fate has in store for you’’; and (4) ‘‘What you
have and don’t have is in the hands of fate.’’
The internal reliability of the scale was .83 in
the European-American sample and .86 in the
Asian-American sample.
To demonstrate the differences in conse-
quences of believing in negotiable fate compared
to believing in agency (the idea that one can
overcome the influence of fate with personal
actions), a four-item measure was also included.
The items in the scale are: (1) ‘‘You can change
your destiny through your effort’’; (2) ‘‘If
you want to, you can determine your fate’’;
(3) ‘‘Through perseverance, you can mold your
destiny’’; and (4) ‘‘You have the power to change
and create your destiny.’’ The internal reliability of
the scale was .88 in the European-American
sample and .78 in the Asian-American sample.
As the dependent measure, we used Choi and
Nisbett’s (2000) strategy to measure the extent of
surprise following expectation disconfirmation.
Specifically, we had participants read three scenar-
ios and indicate how surprised they would be at
the unexpected turn of events on a scale from 1
(not at all surprised) to 7 (very surprised). Two
of these scenarios were: ‘‘Imagine that you are a
consummate fan of Vandt chocolates. This brand
has been around for a long time and you have been
eating it since your childhood. Suddenly Vandt
received some negative press because in some parts
of the country, worms were discovered in Vandt
chocolate bars. There has been a lot of criticisms
of Vandt chocolates’’; and ‘‘Imagine that you are
a fan of Shole Cola. This is a very famous cola
drink, which has been endorsed by many famous
movie stars and pop stars. You have been
consuming this drink for a long time. Shole is in
the news because it was discovered that some of
its bottles and cans contain a harmful quantity of
pesticides and other chemicals.’’ We used the mean
of the three scores to form a measure of surprise
at expectancy disconfirmation (a¼ .81).
Results and discussion
We adopted a significant level of .05 in all analyses
reported in this article. Asian Americans believed
in negotiable fate (M¼ 4.77, SD¼ 0.69) to a
greater extent than did European Americans
(M¼ 4.19, SD¼ 1.00), F(1, 82)¼ 9.06, Z2p¼ .101.
This result supports our assumption that the belief
in negotiable fate is more prevalent in Asian (vs.
European) American context. Consistent with
past findings (Choi & Nisbett, 2000), Asian
Americans were less surprised at the unexpected
outcomes (M¼ 4.31, SD¼ 0.81) than European
Americans (M ¼ 6.01, SD ¼ 0.74), F(1, 82) ¼
100.96, Z2p¼ .552.
To test our hypothesis, we regressed surprise
on ethnicity, negotiable fate (mean-centered), and
their interaction. The predicted interaction was
significant, F(1, 79)¼ 3.90, Z2p¼ .042. For Asian
Americans, those who believed in negotiable fate
were less surprised by the unexpected outcome
(r¼.35). In contrast, for European Americans,
the relationship between negotiable fate and
surprise was not significant (r¼ .03).
This relationship between negotiable fate and
surprise was unique to the belief of negotiable fate.
When we replaced negotiable fate with agency
and fatalism in the analysis, the interaction
effects for agency, F(1, 79)¼ 0.69, and fatalism,
F(1, 79)¼ 1.61, were not significant. Furthermore,
the correlation between negotiable fate and fatal-
ism was not significant in either sample (r¼.09
in the Asian-American sample and r¼ .26 in the
European-American sample). Finally, the correla-
tion between negotiable fate and agency was not
significant in either sample (r¼ .32 in the Asian-
American sample and r¼ .18 in the European-
American sample).
In sum, these results indicate that Asian
(vs. European) Americans, who are more likely
to believe in negotiable fate, are also less surprised
when expectancy is disconfirmed. More impor-
tantly, the belief in negotiable fate is associated
with less surprise among Asian Americans only.
These results are consistent with the assumption
that the belief in negotiable fate enables Asian
Americans to recruit fate as a post-hoc explanation
to make sense of unexpected turns of events
(and are, consequently, less surprised). The dimin-
ished surprise that accompanies the post-hoc
explanation allows individuals to accept unex-
pected outcomes and move on with their lives.
STUDY 2
Study 1 demonstrated that in Asian American
culture, where the belief is negotiable is more
prevalent, the belief in negotiable fate is associated
with the experience of less surprise when learning
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of an unexpected outcome. In the present study,
we adopted the culture priming paradigm
(Hong et al., 2000) to examine how activating
cultural representations may influence the extent
to which a belief in negotiable fate will be
associated with perseverance in the response to
initial frustration.
Although fate control beliefs are prevalent in
Southeast Asian countries, endorsement of these
beliefs is considerably lower among Singaporeans
than people in the neighboring countries (country
mean¼ 2.52 in Singapore versus 2.96 in Malaysia
and 3.14 in Thailand, on a scale that ranges from
1 to 5; Leung & Bond, 2010), probably because,
living in one of the richest countries in Asia,
Singaporeans experience fewer economic con-
straints. In addition, previous research (Chen,
Ng, & Rao, 2005) has found that Singaporean
undergraduates would display the characteristic
pattern of goal pursuit among Asians when
Singaporean culture is primed and the character-
istic pattern of goal pursuit among Americans
when American culture is primed. This result
indicates that Singaporean undergraduates have
rich bicultural experiences and can flexibly switch
between cultural frames depending on which is
activated. Because the meaning of negotiable fate
is more widely accepted in Asian contexts than in
American ones, we hypothesized that when primed
with Singaporean culture, Singaporean under-
graduates would use an Asian cultural frame
to respond to the current situation. Under this
circumstance, the belief in negotiable fate would
be associated with greater persistence. In contrast,
when primed with American culture, Singaporean
undergraduates would use an American cultural
frame to respond to the current situation. Under
this circumstance, the belief in negotiable fate and
persistence would be unrelated.
Method
Participants
Ninety-two students from a private Singaporean
university participated in this study for course
requirement credit. Sixty-six percent of the parti-
cipants were female and the mean age was 21.41
(SD¼ 1.59).
Procedure
Participants were told that the study was about
general knowledge and decision-making. They
completed the same negotiable fate measure used
in Study 1 (a¼ .62), as well as the fatalism (a¼ .79)
and agency (a¼ .90) measures. We used the same
culture priming procedure with the same partici-
pant population as in Chen et al. (2005). The
participants were randomly assigned to receive
the Singaporean or American culture priming
manipulation. Participants in the American
(Singaporean) culture priming condition were
shown a collage of American (Singaporean)
cultural icons and were asked to describe what
they knew about American (Singaporean) culture.
Next, they responded to a scenario designed
to measure the intention to persist upon learning
that their previous efforts did not yield the desired
outcome. Because culture priming effect is short-
lived, we used a brief but focused dependent
measure. Participants were asked to imagine that
they were a manager in a company. A newly hired
employee’s performance was not at the level that
the manager expected, despite the fair amount
of training the manager had invested in the new
employee. Participants’ intention to continue to
invest effort was assessed by the extent of
agreement with the following statement: ‘‘You
don’t want to lose all the training you have
invested in her, so you would rather give her
more time and invest a bit more.’’ Again,
participants indicated their agreement to this
statement on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to
7 (strongly agree).
Results and discussion
The results supported our hypothesis. We
regressed the intention to persist on cultural
priming, negotiable fate (mean-centered), and
their interaction. The only significant effect
was the predicted interaction, F(1, 88) ¼ 5.39,
Z2p¼ .058. When primed with Singaporean culture,
participants who believed more strongly in negoti-
able fate had stronger intention to continue to
invest effort (r¼ .36). When primed with American
culture, negotiable fate did not predict persever-
ance in response to negative feedback (r¼.12).
To demonstrate that this finding is unique to the
belief in negotiable fate, we repeated the analysis,
replacing negotiable fate first with agency and then
with fatalism. The BeliefCulture Priming inter-
action was nonsignificant for the analysis with
agency belief, F(1, 88)¼ 2.30, and nonsignificant
for the analysis with fatalism belief, F(1, 88)¼ 0.86.
Negotiable fate was not correlated with either
agency (r¼ .09) or fatalism (r¼ .05) in this study.
Agency and fatalism were negatively correlated
(r¼.44). In sum, the belief in negotiable fate was
associated with persistence in the face of initial
setbacks only when participants were primed with
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the Singaporean culture. This suggests that negoti-
able fate serves the function of encouraging
perseverance in a cultural context where meaning
of negotiable fate is widely accepted.
STUDY 3
Taken together, Studies 1 and 2 have shown that
in a context where negotiable fate is a prevalent
belief, it is accompanied by strategies that enable
individuals to experience less surprise in response
to unexpected events and to persist upon receiving
negative feedback on their previous efforts. Study
3 seeks to extend these findings by exploring when
negotiable fate may propel individuals to engage
in risk-averse versus risk-taking behaviours.
Although the meaning of negotiable fate is not
widely accepted in American contexts, like other
declarative knowledge, its meaning can be made
salient. To establish the causal impact of a belief
in negotiable fate, we increased the salience of this
belief and its meaning to a sample of American
undergraduates by asking them to recall experi-
ences in which they had to work with (or around)
fate to attain their goals. As a comparison, we had
another group of American undergraduates recall
experiences in which they overcame their fate.
We reason that after having related the meaning
of negotiable fate to personal experiences, this
meaning would increase in salience, and American
participants would then display the characteristic
cognitive style of negotiable fate subscribers.
That is, they would be more risk-averse if they
felt that fate was against them and more risk-
taking when they felt that fate was on their side.
Therefore, after the negotiable fate (or overcoming
fate) manipulation, we asked the participants to
list items and rituals associated with good or bad
luck. We hypothesized that participants who had
related the meaning of negotiable fate to personal
experiences would make more risky choices after
they had listed good (versus bad) luck items
or rituals. However, for participants primed with
overcoming fate, they would try to assert the
potency of their personal actions and engage in
behaviours that could be seen as ‘‘tempting fate.’’
Accordingly, they would make more risky choices
after they had listed bad (versus good) luck items
or rituals.
Method
Participants
The participants were 88 undergraduates from
a public American university, who received course
requirement credit for participating in the study.
Seventy percent of the participants were female,
25% were male, and 5% did not report their
gender. Due to an oversight, age information was
not collected for this study.
Procedure
The experiment consisted of three portions.
In groups of four or five, participants were told
at the beginning that each session consists of
two studies, one conducted by a graduate student
in social psychology on persuasion and another
by a graduate student in cognitive psychology on
decision making (which served as the cover story).
The participants were also told that the study
would start with the persuasion part.
Manipulation of negotiable fate versus overcom-
ing fate. In the ‘persuasion’ study, the experimen-
ter (Experimenter A) told the participants that
the researchers were interested in how people used
personal experiences to construct persuasive mes-
sages. Participants were randomly assigned to
write an essay on the theme of negotiating with
fate or on the theme of overcoming fate.
In the negotiable fate condition, the participants
were given the following instructions.
There are times in life when it’s undeniable
that fate plays a role in determining personal
outcomes; and sometimes, there are inexplicable
turns in events that leave you frustrated. But just
because fate doesn’t give you a smooth road
to success doesn’t mean that you have to accept
failure—there are things that you can do to
negotiate with fate to attain the outcomes you
desire. As the famous saying goes, ‘‘when fate
hands you lemons, make lemonade.’’
In the overcoming fate condition, the partici-
pants were given the following instructions.
Believing in fate is for the weak; only those who
need excuses believe that something other than
your personal actions is responsible for your
outcomes. In truth, the only obstacles that stand
between you and your dreams are self-doubts
because with perseverance and determination,
there is nothing that you cannot attain. As
the famous saying goes, ‘‘if there’s a will, there’s
a way.’’
Participants were then asked to generate three
instances (from either their personal experiences
or the experiences of someone they knew) that
supported the idea given to them, and to use those
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instances to compose a persuasive message
consistent with the opening paragraph. As a
manipulation check, following the fate belief
manipulation, we had participants indicate their
extent of agreement on a seven-point scale (from
1¼ strongly disagree to 7¼ strongly agree) to the
statement ‘‘When fate does not give you the
most favorable situations, you make the best of
the situations you are given.’’
Manipulation of luck. After the participant had
written the essay, the experimenter called another
experimenter (Experimenter B), who was respon-
sible for the ‘‘second study,’’ by phone to let him/
her know that the participants were ready to start
the second experiment. While waiting for
Experimenter B to arrive, Experimenter A asked
the participants if they would mind helping out
with a pilot study for a research project conducted
by a different graduate student. At this point, each
experiment session was randomly assigned to one
of the three experimental conditions. Participants
in the good (bad) luck condition generated
three items and two rituals that were associated
with good (bad) luck. In the control condition,
the participant generated items and rituals that are
necessary for daily functioning.
Dependent measures
The dependent measure consisted of a diverse
set of four items used in previous research to assess
risk-aversion. Three items assessed risk aversion
in consumer choice (Briley, Morris, & Simonson,
2000) and one assessed risk aversion in a
financial investment setting (Bazerman, 1998).
In each scenario, participants were required to
choose between a low-risk/risk-averse option
(e.g., a product with moderate values on two
attributes or a low-risk investment) and one or
two less risk-averse options (e.g., products with
high value on one attribute and low value
on another attribute or a high-risk investment).
We measured the extent of risk-seeking (versus
aversion) by the number of risky choices the
participant made across the four scenarios (0 to 4),
although analysis performed on individual items
yielded the same results for all four scenarios.
Results and discussion
The negotiable fate manipulation was successful in
changing the extent to which participants believed
in negotiable fate, F(1, 88)¼ 4.76, Z2p¼ .051, such
that those in the negotiable fate condition believed
in negotiable fate to a greater extent than those
in the overcoming fate condition.
Consistent with our hypothesis, a Negotiable
FateLuck analysis of variance performed on
risk-taking frequency revealed a significant
interaction, F(2, 81)¼ 5.60, Z2p¼ .12. As shown
in Figure 1, in the negotiable fate condition,
risk seeking increased linearly from the bad luck
condition to the control condition and good
luck condition, F(1, 40)¼ 4.55. In the overcoming
fate condition, risk seeking frequency in the bad
luck condition was significantly higher than in the
good luck condition, F(1, 41)¼ 6.51. However,
participants in the overcoming fate condition
made similar amounts of risky choices in the
control condition compared to the good luck
condition, F(1, 41)¼ 0.50, as well as compared
to the bad luck condition, F(1, 41)¼ 3.71.
Taken together, these results suggest that
when the meaning of negotiable fate is salient,
Americans’ preferences for risky decisions depend
on whether or not they believe that fate is on their
side. Hence, an increased preference would be
observed if they feel that fate is on their side and
a decreased preference when they feel that fate is
against them.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In the present research, we demonstrated that in
cultures where the belief in negotiable fate is more
widely accepted, there are three ways in which this
belief can promote agentic action. Specifically,
individuals who believe more strongly in negoti-
able fate are less likely to experience surprise in
response to an unexpected event (Study 1), more
likely to persevere upon receiving negative feed-
back (Study 2), and more likely to align themselves
with luck to maximize gains and minimize losses
(Study 3). For those who reside in a culture
where this belief is not widely accepted, the belief
in negotiable fate does not serve functions unless
the belief is rendered salient in the immediate
context.
These results show that, at least in some cultural
contexts, believing in negotiable fate is accompa-
nied by cognitive strategies that support agentic
actions. The present research also highlights
ways in which the acknowledgment of fate is not
necessarily accompanied by resignation and with-
drawal. In fact, those who recognized the power of
both fate and personal actions in determining
outcomes were unfazed by unexpected events,
persisted despite negative feedback, and sought
ways to maximize their gains and minimize their
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losses. Therefore, a belief in negotiable fate can
actually be conducive to agentic actions rather
than passivity. The suggestion that individuals
can maintain a sense of personal agency while
acknowledging elements of uncontrollability sheds
new light on the complex and dynamic relationship
between fate and personal agency, and serves as
a starting point for the examination of the concept
of agency from a different angle.
Past research on cultural differences in agency
and control have found that Asians tended to
recall a greater number and more recent instances
of secondary control (or adjustment; Morling,
Kitayama, & Miyamoto, 2002), where they
adjust themselves to their situations; whereas
Americans tend to recall a greater number and
more recent instances of primary control (or
influence; Morling et al., 2002), where they seek
to influence the situations to attain desirable
outcomes. The results of the studies reported
in this paper suggest that negotiable fate may
represent a type of primary control that has not
been recognized in the cultural psychology litera-
ture. Although individuals do accept (rather than
attempt to overcome) the constraints that they
face, adjustment to the situation takes on an
agentic flavour rather than a helpless one. This
belief allows individuals to maintain control over
the aspects of their lives that they perceive as
changeable.
It is important to note that the cognitive effects
of negotiable fate are observed only in cultural
contexts where the fate belief is widely accepted.
Apparently, the agentic meaning of this fate belief
must be part of the shared reality in the culture for
it to have an effect on cognition. Au et al. (in press)
also found that the belief in negotiable fate
is associated with active coping only in societies
where the belief is widely accepted (Mainland
China). Taken together, these results support
the intersubjective consensus perspective on the
cognitive effects of culture (Chiu et al., 2010;
Zou et al., 2009). According to this perspective,
a cultural value or belief would impact cognitions
only when it is part of the shared reality in the
culture—the value or belief is firmly established
in the culture. When a value or belief becomes a
part of the shared reality in the culture, it becomes
a commonsensical notion in the culture—its mean-
ing is immediately discerned and its associated
practices readily accepted in the culture. For
instance, the idea of negotiable fate is more
easily understood and its cognitive strategies (like
the ones examined in the present research) and
behavioral practices (e.g., feng shui) more readily
accepted in Asian than in American contexts.
This raises the question of what contributes to
the relative prominence of the belief in negotiable
fate in a culture. Au et al. (in press) contend that
negotiable fate is more established in sociocultural
contexts where people face many constraints in
pursuing their goals than in sociocultural contexts
where individuals experience relatively few con-
straints in their goal pursuits, because this belief
acknowledges the constraints the individual has
to face and hence encourages objective appraisal
of the environment, but at the same time entertains
the possibility of bringing about desired out-
comes through agentic actions. In support of this
contention, Au et al. (in press) found that country
differences in the strength of the belief in negoti-
able fate are partly mediated by the perceived
immutability of environmental constraints in the
society. Several recent studies have linked cultural
differences in values and beliefs to the level
of environmental constraints on goal pursuits
Figure 1. Mean number of risky choices as a function of fate and luck manipulations.
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(e.g., job immobility, Chen, Chiu, & Chan, 2009;
residential immobility, Oishi, Lun, & Sherman,
2007). Au et al.’s (in press) analysis of negotiable
fate adds to this analysis and draws attention
to future research on the ecological foundation
of the cognitive and behavioral consequences of
negotiable fate.
CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS
FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
In three studies, we have shown how the belief
in negotiable fate propels individuals to engage in
agentic actions in contexts where this belief is
widely shared. This is the first step to under-
standing this belief, and numerous exciting
research avenues can be explored in the future.
First, future research is needed to further extend
the nomological network of the construct of
negotiable fate. For example, negotiable fate and
fate control are related but distinct constructs.
As noted in the introduction, fate control covers a
broader range of fate beliefs and hence supports
a greater variety of agentic actions. For example,
the beliefs in cycles of good and bad luck and
the predictability of luck are two fate control
beliefs that the construct of negotiable fate does
not capture. By focusing on the belief that one
can make the best out of fate, the construct of
negotiable fate predicts agentic behaviors in the
face of severe constraints in goal pursuits, but may
not predict other agentic behaviors covered in the
broader construct of fate control (e.g., predictive
control of luck).
As a first step to explore the extent of overlap
between negotiable fate and fate control, in one
study (Au et al., in press), we had Chinese
undergraduates and European American under-
graduates complete the negotiable fate measure,
and the fate control subscale and the religiosity
subscale in the social axiom measure (Leung &
Bond, 2004). The participants also filled out a
measure of the belief that the world and its
institutions are fixed (Chiu, Dweck, Tong, & Fu,
1997). In both samples, the belief in negotiable fate
was significantly correlated with fate control,
although the size of the correlations was low
(r¼ .23 in the Chinese sample and .17 in the
American sample), suggesting the presence of
partial overlap in the constructs of negotiable
fate and fate control. In the Chinese sample,
negotiable fate was uncorrelated with religiosity.
However, in the American sample, the correspond-
ing correlation was positive (r¼ .29). This result
suggests that the notion of negotiable fate is more
grounded in religion in the United States than in
China. Importantly, consistent with our ecological
perspective on fate belief, in both samples, the
belief in negotiable fate was positively correlated
with the belief that the world and its institutions
are not malleable (rUS¼ .24, rChina¼ .19). That is,
the belief in negotiable fate is more prevalent
among individuals who believe that they live in an
environment with relatively unchangeable external
constraints. These initial findings are interesting.
Nonetheless, future research is needed to further
delineate the extent of overlap in the range of
phenomena predicted by negotiable fate and fate
control, and to connect negotiable fate to other
individual difference measures (such as global
personality traits, control beliefs) in order to
deepen our understanding of the psychological
meaning of these fate beliefs.
In addition, researchers may wish to explore the
effect of a belief in negotiable fate in other risk-
taking domains, such as examining how the
belief affects the type of information used to
make financial investment decisions. Would nego-
tiable fate believers place greater emphasis on
feelings or signs of luck, or more on information
on past performance of a particular type of
investment? Another interesting area for research
is how negotiable fate is related to long-term
versus short-term orientation. As a consequence
of the need to maintain faith in their personal
actions despite short-term frustration, it is possible
that negotiable fate believers would take a
relatively long-term perspective as this motivates
them to persist by believing that the future will be
brighter despite the current situation.
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